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The Scottish Parliament Election 2016: another momentous event but 
dull campaign 
 
Abstract. The Scottish Parliament election in 2016 produced two surprising results: it 
represents a reversal of SNP/ Labour party fortunes so complete that we now take it for 
granted, but the SNP did not achieve a widely-expected majority; and, the huge surge of 
support for the Scottish Conservatives was enough to make it (easily) the second largest 
party.  A mistaken sense of inevitability of the result - another SNP majority - helped produce 
a dull campaign and keep alive the prospect of a second referendum on Scottish 
independence. This article has four main sections: putting the 2016 election in recent 
historical context; considering the implications of consistently high SNP support on the 
constitution; highlighting key issues in the election campaign; and, examining the SNP’s 
policy agenda from 2016. 
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The Scottish Parliament election in 2016 was momentous, but not entirely for the reasons we 
expected. The main outcome is the SNP’s third victory in a row since 2007, which is likely to 
keep it in office until at least 2021. The results eclipse the former record by Scottish Labour, 
which governed Scotland in coalition with the Scottish Liberal Democrats from 1999-2007. 
The SNP also improved its constituency votes and seats, but lost enough ground in the 
regional list to deprive it of a second outright majority in a row. Consequently, given such 
high expectations for the SNP - on the back of its ‘landslide’ victory in 2011 and thumping 
win in the UK General Election in 2015 - its third Holyrood election victory in a row can be 
interpreted as a further indicator of its success but also a sign that its dominance should not 
be taken for granted. Its circa-45% share of the vote was enough to produce a majority in 
2011 but not 2016. Further, while the now-predictable decline of Scottish Labour seems 
almost complete, this time the main beneficiary was the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party which became the main opposition in Holyrood for the first time. The Liberal 
Democrats have also seen their fall from grace confirmed by a second poor showing which 
relegates them to the fifth and smallest party in Holyrood. 
The historical significance of these trends is difficult to overstate. In the first Holyrood 
election in 1999 it seemed inevitable that Scottish Labour would be the largest party, with the 
SNP likely to represent an opposition party well off the pace. The early years were premised 
on the idea that, with devolution secure, the biggest party could focus on the political reforms 
associated with ‘new politics’, combining key measures associated with symbolic politics 
(including the greater representation of women and participation in politics beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’) and substantive policy change. This expectation continued in 2003 but ended in 
2007 when the SNP became the largest party by one seat. In 2011, its ‘landslide’ victory to 
secure a majority of seats – and trigger a process which led to a referendum on Scottish 
independence in 2014 – seemed extraordinary (particularly since Holyrood uses a mixed-
member-proportional, not plurality, system). Now, in 2016, the SNP has become so dominant 
of Scottish politics that its majority seemed inevitable. This sense of inevitability was 
bolstered by its showing in the UK General election 2015, when the party that always 
previously secured a small minority of seats – its highest ever number of seats was 11 (of 71, 
from 30% of the vote in October 1974) - won 56 of 59 (aided by a plurality system which 
exaggerated the effect of its 50% share of the vote). By 2016, on the back of several opinion 
polls, many expected its electoral dominance to be complete (although compare Philip, 2016 
with Carrell and Brooks, 2016a). 
Consequently, although the change over 17 years is phenomenal, this recent sense of 
inevitability helped produce a dull campaign. In all other Holyrood elections there was either 
the promise of novelty (from 1999) or high competition between the two main parties (from 
2007), to produce a sense of the high stakes involved. So, we saw meaningful competition to 
accentuate important differences between parties on key policy issues or portray a party’s 
better vision and image of governing competence. This time we knew that, for the most part, 
one manifesto counted far more than the rest.  
It is also difficult to find evidence of success when the other parties have tried to interrogate 
the SNP’s record in government on issues such as health, education, and policing (Cairney, 
2016b). This limitation helped produce, in early post-election commentary, a feeling (albeit 
with limited evidence) that the SNP didn’t need to rely as much on this image of governing 
competence, since so many of its new members and high number of voters seem to remain 
enthused more by the implications of SNP electoral success (more constitutional change) than 
its record in office. SNP spokespeople countered with the argument that the election 
represents a public vindication of its record. So, we need to wait for detailed analysis on the 
role of valence politics and, in particular the parties’ images of governing competence, which 
was so central to SNP success in 2007 and 2011 (‘most voters thought that the party would 
do a better job in office than its rivals’ - Johns et al, 2013: 158).  
Still, this legacy of the 2014 referendum can be found in the election debates in 2016. While 
the SNP has been looking for ways to keep alive, but postpone, a second referendum, the 
three main opposition parties continue to describe the SNP as a one issue party or extol the 
possibilities for policy change already afforded by further devolution in 2015. Of the few 
substantive issues to be discussed without a referendum frame, perhaps only educational 
attainment stands out because it is the issue on which First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has 
asked to be judged (while ‘fracking’ remains the issue that many in the SNP leadership would 
like to ignore).  
Overall, this election comes with a strong sense of unfinished business elsewhere. In the short 
term, it has been overshadowed either by UK party politics (in the run up to local and 
mayoral elections) or the ‘Brexit’ referendum (June 2016) on the UK’s future in or out of the 
European Union. In the longer term, the SNP’s continued dominance keeps the issue of 
Scottish independence high on the agenda. 
The 2016 Scottish Parliament election result 
Table 1 highlights the importance of constituency voting and seats to the success of the SNP. 
Its 46.5% share of the vote translated into 81% of constituency seats, a position offset 
significantly by the d’Hondt formula which restricted it to 4 (of a possible 56) additional 
regional seats. Although not entirely proportional, the Mixed Member Proportional system 
reduced its overall total to just under a majority. It also helped ensure that:  
 the Scottish Conservatives - who secured only 7 (9.6%) seats from 22% of the 
constituency vote – won a slightly greater proportion of seats (31, 24%) than of the 
vote 
 Scottish Labour – 3 (4.1%) of seats from 22.6% of the constituency vote – could 
offset major (and disproportionate) constituency losses; and 
 the Scottish Greens became the fourth largest party. 
In contrast, the Liberal Democrats won four of their five seats from well-targeted 
constituency contests. 
 
Table 1: Scottish Parliament election result 2016 





Scottish National Party 46.5% 59 41.7% 4 63 48.8% 
Scottish Conservatives 22.0% 7 22.9% 24 31 24.0% 
Scottish Labour  22.6% 3 19.1% 21 24 18.6% 
Scottish Greens 0.6% 0 6.6% 6 6 4.7% 
Scottish Liberal 
Democrats 7.8% 4 5.2% 1 5 3.9% 
 
Source: BBC News (2016c). Turnout 55.6% (of 4,099,407).  
 
The only clear majority was secured by men. Although the symbolic representation of women 
in the Scottish Parliament was a key plank of the ‘new politics’ of Scottish devolution, 
women continue to secure just over one-third of seats. In 2016, women secured 45 of 129 
seats (35%), which compares with 37% in 1999, 40% in 2003, 33% in 2007, and 35% in 
2011 (table 2).  
 
Table 2: Women MSPs, by Party, 1999-2016  
 1999 2003 2007 2011 2016 
SNP 15 (42.9%) 9 (33.3%) 12 (25.5%) 19 (27.5%) 27 (42.9%) 
Conservative 3 (16.7%) 4 (22.2%) 5 (31.2%) 6 (40.0%) 6 (19.4%) 
Labour 28 (50.0%) 28 (56.0%) 23 (50.0%) 17 (45.9%) 11 (45.8%) 
Greens 0 (0%) 2 (28.6%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 1 (16.7%) 
Lib Dems 2   (11.8%) 2   (11.8%) 2   (12.5%) 1    (20.0%) 0 (0%) 
Total  48 (37.2%) 51 (39.5%) 43 (33.3%) 45 (34.9%) 45 (34.9%) 
 
Source: adapted and updated (using figures from Gender Politics, 2016 and Swann, 2016b) from Cairney et al 
(2015a: 9). Table does not include ‘other’ parties/ independents. 
 
The number of women in the Scottish Parliament used to depend strongly on the fate of 
Scottish Labour: the high point of 40% in 2003 was on the back of 28 Labour MSPs 
representing 56% of its group and accounting for 55% of women MSPs (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013: 106; Cairney et al, 2015a). At the time, it was the only party to ‘twin’ 
constituencies and alternate women/men candidates on the regional list (Mackay and Kenny, 
2007: 86-7). Other parties pursued less systematic or effective measures: the Liberal 
Democrats’ were ‘half hearted’ (Kenny and MacKay, 2013: 8; Cairney, 2011, 30); the SNP 
had ‘an informal rule of thumb that [regional] lists should be more-or less gender balanced’ 
(Mackay and Kenny, 2007: 87), the Conservatives sometimes ensured that women ‘were 
generally placed in favourable positions on the party lists’, and the Greens alternated men and 
women on party lists with uncertain effect (Kenny and MacKay, 2013: 9). Now, as Labour’s 
fortunes have dropped, the decision by the SNP to use stronger measures - including All 
Women Shortlists for seats vacated by retiring MSPs - (ensuring that 13 of its 17 new MSPs 
were women) seems particularly important (Kenny and Mackay, 2013; Kenny et al, 2015; 
Swann, 2016a; on the substantive representation of women, see Engender 2016a; 2016b).  
The symbolic representation of other important social groups is more difficult to measure so 
soon after the election (although the Scottish Parliament recently gained international 
attention for having three gay party leaders (or co-convenors) among five parties - Cairney, 
2016b). 
The 2016 result in context: trends since 1999 
Scottish Labour had dominated Westminster and local elections in Scotland for decades 
before the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999 (it also won a plurality of European 
Parliament seats, but with far lower margins): 
 Westminster (plurality electoral system). Labour won most Scottish seats in every 
election from 1959-2010. In 1997, it won 46% of the vote and 56 (78%) of 72 
Scottish Westminster seats (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 45). The SNP won 22% of 
the vote and 6 (8%) seats. A similar pattern continued until 2010: Labour dominated 
Scottish Westminster seats even when the SNP began to win Holyrood elections.  
 Local elections (plurality until 2003, single transferable vote from 2007). In 1995, its 
44% of the vote translated into 613 (53%) of 1155 seats and it remained the largest 
party until 2007 (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 51). 
This dominance produced an expectation that Scottish Labour would become the largest party 
in the Scottish Parliament for the foreseeable future. In that context, the fortunes of Labour 
and the SNP changed remarkably quickly (table 3). In 1999 and 2003, the main limit to 
Labour dominance was the electoral system: it won the majority of constituency seats 
comfortably but few regional seats (it also won most constituency seats in 2007). By 2011, 
this position had reversed and, by 2016, the regional list was the only thing standing between 
Scottish Labour and electoral oblivion.  
In contrast, by 2011 the SNP achieved a majority of Scottish Parliament seats because the 
regional element of the mixed-member proportional system (56 of 129 seats) was not large 
enough to offset SNP dominance of constituency seats. This is a remarkable outcome if we 
accept the well-shared story that Holyrood’s electoral system was ‘chosen by Labour to stop 
the SNP ever the getting the majority it needed to push hard on the independence agenda’ 
(Cairney, 2011: 28), although its effect in 2016 (to stop the SNP forming another majority 
government) may help postpone a second referendum. The SNP’s success generally 
continues at the expense of the smaller parties, most of which only secured a major presence 
in one (2003 election). The exception is the Scottish Green Party which became Holyrood’s 
fourth largest party in 2016. 
Table 3: Scottish Parliament Election Results 1999-2016 
  Const. Seats List Seats Total Seats % Seats 
Scottish National Party 
1999 28.7% 7 27.3% 28 35 27.1% 
2003 23.8% 9 21.6% 18 27 20.9% 
2007 32.9% 21 31.0% 26 47 36.4% 
2011 45.4% 53 44.0% 16 69 53.5% 
2016 46.5% 59 41.7% 4 63 48.8% 
Scottish Conservatives 
1999 15.6% 0 15.4% 18 18 14.0% 
2003 16.6% 3 15.5% 15 18 14.0% 
2007 16.6% 4 13.9% 13 17 13.2% 
2011 13.9% 3 12.4% 12 15 11.6% 
2016 22.0% 7 22.9% 24 31 24.0% 
Scottish Labour 
1999 38.8% 53 33.6% 3 56 43.4% 
2003 34.6% 46 29.6% 4 50 38.8% 
2007 32.2% 37 29.2% 9 46 35.7% 
2011 31.7% 15 26.3% 22 37 28.7% 
2016 22.6% 3 19.1% 21 24 18.6% 
Scottish Greens 
1999 0.0% 0 3.6% 1 1 0.8% 
2003 0.0% 0 6.5% 7 7 5.4% 
2007 0.2% 0 4.0% 2 2 1.6% 
2011 0.0% 0 6.7% 2 2 1.6% 
2016 0.6% 0 6.6% 6 6 4.7% 
Scottish Liberal Democrats 
1999 14.2% 12 12.4% 5 17 13.2% 
2003 15.4% 13 11.6% 4 17 13.2% 
2007 16.2% 11 13.9% 5 16 12.4% 
2011 7.9% 2 5.2% 3 5 3.9% 
2016 7.8% 4 5.2% 1 5 3.9% 
Other 
1999 2.7% 1 7.7% 1 2 3.9% 
2003 9.6% 2 15.2% 8 10 5.5% 
2007 3.1% 0 8.0% 1 1 0.8% 
2011 1.1% 0 7.7% 1 1 0.8% 
2016 0.5% 0 4.5% 0 0 0% 
 
Note: Other includes the Scottish Socialist Party, which won 1 seat in 1999 and 6 in 2003. 
 
 Issues raised (or not) in the election campaign: independence 
A key talking point was that the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 did not settle the 
constitutional debate (Cairney, 2015a). Instead, the main opposition parties wove into their 
2015 and 2016 campaigns the idea that the SNP will use any election victory to push for a 
second referendum. Yet, the only plausible trigger, in the short term, relates to the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU in June 2016: SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon 
argued that, if most voters in Scotland vote to stay in, and most voters in the UK overall vote 
to leave, it would ‘almost certainly’ prompt SNP demands for the second Scottish 
independence referendum (BBC News, 2016a).   
In the absence of this constitutional crisis, is difficult to see how the SNP could justify – and, 
more importantly, expect to win – another referendum within five years of the first. This 
problem is reflected in the SNP’s manifesto and Sturgeon’s defence of its vague position. It 
appears to want to keep independence on the agenda for the long term without proposing a 
referendum within five years. So, its idea is that, in the absence of a Brexit crisis, the only 
other prompt is a major and sustained upswing in support for independence: ‘the Scottish 
Parliament should have the right to hold another referendum if there is clear and sustained 
evidence that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish 
people’ (Scottish National Party, 2016: 23). Sturgeon confirmed that this measure would be 
from opinion polls – ‘We would have to see, in a range of polls over a period of time, that 
independence had become the preferred option of the majority’ – but without stating how 
many polls, what level of support, or how sustained (BBC News, 2016b). The unsatisfactory 
nature of this position seems reinforced by the SNP’s position in 2016: the last referendum 
was fairly recent, it lacks a strong statement of intent in its manifesto, it now relies on the 
Scottish Greens (2016: 35) to produce a pro-independence majority, and the Greens’ trigger 
for a second referendum – a petition by maybe 100,000 voters – seems equally vague and 
problematic. 
Use the powers you have, and the further powers you gained 
The prospect of a Yes vote in the Scottish referendum prompted the main UK parties to 
promise substantially greater devolution, before the May 2016 election, to secure a No vote 
(Cairney, 2015a). So, the Scotland Act 2016 contains provisions to enhance the Scottish 
Government’s powers, including a greater ability to modify income tax rates and bands and 
reform some aspects of social security.   
This development prompted much debate but no resolution on how to use the so-called 
‘Scottish rate of income tax’ or SRIT (the power to modify income tax rates and bands was 
devolved in the 2016 Act). What could have been a values-driven discussion about the 
benefits and costs of raising income tax to fund services, or about who should win and lose 
from taxation changes, has generally turned into a pedantic and (perhaps deliberately) 
confusing debate about: the meaning of ‘progressive’ taxation (Eiser, 2016a describes a rise 
in SRIT as ‘slightly progressive’); the likely income from each 1p change in taxation; and, 
the unintended consequences (such as high earners leaving Scotland) of greater higher-rate 
taxation in Scotland (Eiser, 2016b).  Further, since the SNP’s victory seemed inevitable, it 
became difficult to treat the tax plans of the other parties as serious prospects, including 
Scottish Labour’s (2016) planned 1p rise (coupled with compensation for affected low 
earners), the Scottish Greens’ (2016) more radical income and land tax plans, and the Scottish 
Conservatives’ (2016; Carrell, 2016) unfulfilled hopes to reduce it (alongside its proposal to 
reintroduce tuition fees).   
Further, it is difficult to conclude that there would have been more serious discussion if the 
stakes were higher. Instead, the debate confirmed the important of ‘narratives’ in politics 
(Jones et al, 2014). Political parties and their supporters tell simple stories to appeal to the 
cognitive biases of voters, such as their tendency to trust the messenger of the information 
rather than the information itself, or reject the arguments of the people that they demonise 
(Sabatier et al, 1987). So, the SRIT is a tax that very few politicians want to raise, and many 
would rather show voters the dire effects of other people changing the rate – often with 
reference to emotionally charged scenarios such as the effect of a tax rise on low paid and 
hard-working nurses. Further, some debates on forums such as Twitter suggested that key 
players could not even agree on the best way to present the basic arithmetic of any change. 
Consequently, the debate was largely about which party leaders could be portrayed most 
easily as the heroes and villains of the piece, when we knew that very little would change 
anyway (Cairney, 2016a). 
Fracking 
Although it is only one case, ‘fracking’ policy suggests that internal SNP tension may often 
be as important as the actions of the opposition parties (see Cairney, 2016c). Initially, it 
introduced a moratorium after some intense competition with Scottish Labour in the run up to 
the UK General election. Since them, Scottish Labour (2016: 6) has declared an unequivocal 
opposition to fracking which is only matched by the Scottish Greens (2016: 11; the Scottish 
Conservatives, 2016: 33 are in favour). Yet the extension of the moratorium – and continued 
sensitivity within the SNP Government - often seems more to do with the debate within the 
party that the SNP is struggling to manage (unless, as in 2016, it manages to rule out debate 
completely at its annual conference). In any case, its current position is now, to all intents and 
purposes, far closer to the Greens/Labour than the Conservatives because no extraction of 
fossil fuels could meet the absolute standard it now describes: ‘We will not allow fracking or 
underground coal gasification in Scotland unless it can be proved beyond any doubt that it 
will not harm our environment, communities or public health’ (SNP, 2016: 9).   
One party state versus effective opposition: Conservative success, Labour failure 
The opposition parties had begun to face an electoral dilemma: do they make an exaggerated 
complaint that SNP dominance has produced something akin to a one party state, or make a 
more positive case for the need for a strong opposition? In this election, the Conservative 
party chose the latter to great effect. Its manifesto presents three remarkably simple 
messages: we have a strong and charismatic leader, we represent the party that will oppose 
most strongly a second referendum on independence (and you should too, because we now 
have a ‘powerhouse Parliament’), and we will provide the strongest opposition to the SNP. 
Indeed, many of its campaign materials emphasised Ruth Davidson’s leadership without 
mentioning the party’s name at all, in part to address the low value of the Conservative brand 
in Scotland without becoming a separate Scottish party (see Convery, 2012).  
In contrast, Scottish Labour suffered again from its association with its parent/UK party, 
combining: the sense that the Scottish branch does not have enough autonomy to make 
policy, and its vulnerability to the unpopularity of the UK party (accentuated in the run up to 
the election by the issue of anti-Semitism - Gardham, 2016). 
The Conservative party may also be the first to stress so strongly the value of opposition as 
an end in itself (in part because it has little chance of becoming the first party). This might 
help reduce very slightly my sense (Cairney, 2011: 39) that the Scottish Parliament lacks the 
resources to ensure that opposition parties are effective, even during minority government 
(when the SNP had 47 of 129 seats) and even if they use committee and plenary proceedings 
to good effect.  
The SNP’s policy agenda from 2016: will minority government make a difference? 
Nicola Sturgeon decided to lead a minority government almost immediately after the final 
result (Carrell and Brooks, 2016b). This means that the SNP’s manifesto is not the only one 
that counts, but it is difficult to predict the specific extent to which other parties will play a 
role. The SNP does not need the support of other parties in the same way as in 2007 when it 
held 47 seats and relied on the support of at least two parties (or, sometimes, the 
Conservatives plus Margo MacDonald) to gain a majority. Back then, its minority status 
produced some actual and anticipated lost votes, prompting it to back the Edinburgh trams 
project, drop its plans to reform the council tax, lose a vote to introduce a minimum unit price 
on alcohol, and postpone its bill to produce a referendum on independence.  
This time, it will be defeated rarely because a majority opposition would rely on the 
Conservatives, Labour, and Greens – and it is difficult to think of an issue that unites those 
three parties against the SNP. For example: 
 Labour and the Greens oppose fracking but the Conservatives support it (and pro-
development would be secured largely through existing planning powers, not primary 
legislation). 
 Labour and the Greens would support an increase in the upper income tax band, but 
the Conservatives would oppose. 
 The Scottish Conservatives (2016: 9) discuss ‘Reversing the Named Persons law’ (in 
the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014) but a successful opposition bill 
to reverse Scottish Government policy is inconceivable.  
 The parties agree broadly on other issues, such as to boost funding for the NHS and 
reduce the ‘attainment gap’ in education (which will rely largely on funding and 
perhaps measures to increase parental involvement, or perhaps reduce the local 
authority role, which the Conservatives would likely support).  
 The SNP needs support to pass its annual budget bill, but only from one party. 
Further, from 2007-11 this process generally ran smoothly. The exception was 2009, 
when its bill fell in the first round and passed in the second. The process allowed each 
party to appear to secure ‘concessions’, but the changes were largely consistent with 
SNP policy and produced a marginal change in the budget (Cairney, 2011: 54-6). 
Further, key policy outcomes will not depend on outputs from the Scottish Parliament. 
Instead, they will result from behaviour of many actors in a complex policymaking system, in 
which the Scottish Parliament generally plays a peripheral role and the Scottish Government 
only plays one part. This point has major implications to the idea of strong opposition put 
forward by the Scottish Conservatives. 
Effective opposition revisited 
The idea of opposition in the Scottish Parliament relates strongly to the language of ambition, 
high stakes competition, central government control, and accountability through elections 
(Cairney, 2016d). Parties compete to tell you the transformations they can deliver with 
Scottish Government powers, the elections are high stakes because much power is held in 
Scottish central government and, if there is high central control, with major ‘levers’ of policy 
change, you know who is in charge and therefore who to praise or blame. So, the dominant 
message of Scottish Parliament elections is: let’s blame or praise the central government 
because it is in control and has the levers to make things happen.  
In contrast, policy studies suggest that ministers can achieve far less in central government. 
Key phrases highlight the limits to central control and the pragmatic ways in which the centre 
shares policymaking responsibility with other actors such as local public bodies and 
‘stakeholders’: 
 Policy communities. Ministers can only pay attention to a fraction of the things for 
which they are formally in charge. So, they pay disproportionate attention to a small 
number of issues and ignore the rest. They delegate responsibility for those tasks to 
civil servants, who consult with stakeholders to produce policy. 
 Governance (not government). There is a blurry boundary between formal 
responsibility and informal influence. A huge number of actors are involved in the 
policy process and it is difficult to separate their effects. Instead, we often think of 
policy outcomes as the product of collective action, only some of which is 
coordinated by central government. 
 Complexity, or complex government. In complex policymaking systems, policy 
outcomes seem to ‘emerge’ from local practices and rules, often despite central 
government attempts to control them. Consequently, there is a large literature which 
tries to produce pragmatic responses to deal with the limits to central government 
control (Cairney, 2012a; 2012b; 2015b; Jordan and Cairney, 2013) 
In that context, there are good reasons for central governments to share power and 
responsibility with other actors, including: civil servants have the capacity, knowledge, and 
networks to research and make detailed policies; many public bodies like ‘quangos’ need to 
be at ‘arm’s length’ from ministers to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of their public; local 
governments have their own mandates, often possess a keener sense of the needs of local 
communities, and can work in partnership with local stakeholders and public bodies to 
produce long term strategies for their areas; stakeholders provide knowledge and advice on 
how to deliver policies in specialised areas; and, service users often have profound insights 
on the public services they receive. So, alongside fighting elections, the Scottish Government 
tries to produce pragmatic ways to share policymaking responsibility and encourage new 
mechanisms of accountability: institutional, local, community, service user (Cairney, 2015c). 
The main problem is this: it is difficult to reconcile these forms of accountability, partly 
because the new approaches suggest that the central government is trying to shirk 
responsibility for its actions. During elections and parliamentary scrutiny time it is difficult 
for ministers to argue that they should only be held to account in a limited way. 
Consequently, they play the game of democratic accountability and shared responsibility, 
producing highly contradictory strategies. On the one hand, they pursue things like 
‘prevention’ strategies which encourage relatively hands-off policymaking for the long term 
in cooperation with local bodies (Cairney et al, 2015b). On the other, they make election 
promises – for example, on the numbers of police officers, teachers, and nurses they’ll 
employ – and maintain performance management systems (including NHS waiting times 
targets) to show that they are in charge and making some progress. These actions to achieve 
short term electoral success can undermine the long term strategies. So, the kind of effective 
opposition promised by the Conservatives remains to be seen: it should consider a pragmatic 
approach to hold the Scottish Government to account in a meaningful way but it, like the 
SNP in government, will face intense pressure to play the game of democratic accountability. 
‘Strong opposition’ will likely mean saying ‘no’ to SNP policies during legislative debates 
and playing the blame game in First Minister’s Questions. 
Conclusion: a momentous event which does not settle the matter  
We hold elections and referendums in part to generate a sense of the settled will. Voters 
choose parties of government and their favoured constitutional settlements. Yet, in 2016, we 
still retain a sense of unfinished business. The SNP’s win, but not majority, helps postpone 
but not rule out a second referendum on Scottish independence. The next referendum, on the 
UK’s position in the European Union, could prompt a further constitutional crisis in Scotland 
within two months of the election. In the meantime, or in the absence of crisis, the Scottish 
Government can use the powers it has, but there is no clear sense of what they are and if the 
SNP Government has much incentive to use them. Perhaps most importantly, the problems 
that the Scottish Government would like to solve – such as socioeconomic and other 
inequalities, and their effect on health outcomes and education attainment – often seem 
impervious to central government control, regardless of the ‘levers’ it controls.  We elect 
governments to solve these problems, and blame them if they fail, but without demonstrating 
the extent to which we can actually hold them responsible in a meaningful way for the policy 
outcomes of complex systems. The Scottish Parliament election in 2016 was momentous in 
terms of party and constitutional politics, but its longer term impact on policy outcomes 
remains to be seen. 
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